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Abstract: We develop an equilibrium search model of the housing market where sellers may become
distressed as they are unable to sell. A unique steady state equilibrium exists where distressed sellers
attempt re sales by accepting prices that are substantially below fundamental values. During periods
where a large number of sellers are forced to liquidate customers exhibit predation : they hold o¤ purchas-
ing and strategically slow down the speed of trade, which in turn causes more sellers to become distressed.
From sellerspoint of view liquidity disappears when it is needed the most. The model naturally suggests
several proxies of liquidity. Interestingly, the expected time on the market, one of the most frequently
used statistics in the literature, does a poor job within the context of re sales and predation.
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1 Introduction
Selling a house involves a long and non-trivial search process where the home seller faces a trade-o¤ between
the price and the time to sale. With su¢ cient time and no pressure to sell immediately, a seller can a¤ord
to wait to receive a price commensurate with the market value. However, due to factors such as bankruptcy,
job loss, foreclosure, relocation, divorce etc. some sellers become distressed and attempt a re sale in an
e¤ort to quickly sell and exit the market.
What is more, the presence of distressed sellers seems to a¤ect buyerspurchasing behavior. During the
recent housing crisis, for instance, where presumably a large number of sellers became distressed, buyers did
exhibit what we call predatory buying. Despite the falling prices and the rising number of re sales customers
were reluctant to purchase appearing to be strategically delaying purchasing in an e¤ort to obtain better
deals.
Based on these observations we develop an equilibrium search model of the housing market with two
distinctive features. First, buyerswillingness to pay is private information and more importantly, second,
sellers may become distressed as they wait to sell. Sellers enter the market in a regular state, or regular
mood; though, as they are unable to sell they may be hit by an exogenous shock (job-loss, bankruptcy
etc.) and become distressed. Regular and distressed sellers di¤er from each other in terms of their time
preferences: once distressed, a seller discounts future utility more heavily.
What do we nd? First, we show that in equilibrium nancially distressed sellers indeed pursue re sales.
They accept prices that are substantially below fundamental values and consequently sell faster than regular
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1
sellers. How low the sale price can go depends on how severe the shock is. We show that the more painful
the shock the lower the sale price and the quicker the sale.
A re sale is costly not only because it is associated with signicant price drops, but also it opens the
door for predatory buying. We show that during periods where a large number of sellers are likely to
encounter nancial distress (e.g. a crisis or recession) the followings occur. First, the number of re sales
rises. Second, all sellers, regular and distressed, drop their prices. And most importantly, third, customers
exhibit predation: they become more selective and hold o¤ purchasing despite the abundance of distressed
sales and lower prices. By doing so customers strategically slow down the speed of trade causing more sellers
to become distressed, which in turn, exerts more pressure on sellers forcing them for further price cuts, and
so on. From the buyerspoint of view such behavior is optimal as it allows them to acquire better houses at
lower prices, but from a sellers point of view it is the worst possible outcome. Indeed for distressed sellers
liquidity disappears when it is mostly needed.
The model naturally suggests several proxies measuring liquidity from di¤erent angels. A rst proxy is the
expected time on the market TOM, which provides useful information regarding the speed and the volume
of trade. A second proxy deals with the loss of prots in re sales. We construct an index z (see Section
5) that captures a distressed sellers percentage-wise prot loss in a re sale. Curiously, though, TOM one
of the most frequently used and referred statistics in the literature does a poor job in the context of re
sales. We show that TOM falls during periods of predatory buying, which, if interpreted on the face value,
indicates that the market becomes more liquid and more e¢ cient with predation. In our framework the
index z appears to be a more robust proxy of liquidity than TOM is.
Finally, the model provides simple and intuitive answers to two puzzles raised by Merlo and Ortalo-
Magné [12]. Based on a unique data set of individual residential property transactions in England, the
authors document that about 2/3 of sellers do not change the listing price at all, while remaining sellers
revise the listing prices at least once (typically once). The facts that some seller revise the listing price while
others do not and that price revisions are infrequent (on average, once in 11 weeks) and sizable (about 10%
of the initial listing price) are in stark contrast to the predictions of most existing theories in the housing
market. Based on the same data set the authors document a negative correlation between the sale price and
the duration of the sale the longer the time on the market the lower the sale price. This fact, again, is
inconsistent with most of the existing theoretical models.
According to our model some sellers revise the listing price while others do not simply because some
sellers become distressed while others do not. The ones who become distressed revise their listing price;
the revision occurs only once (when the shock hits) and it can be sizeable if the shock is severe see the
simulation in Figure 5c. The negative correlation between the sale price and the duration is also easy to
explain. Properties sold soon after the listing date are most likely "regular sales". Sellers of such properties
cannot possibly become distressed within a short period of time. Sales taking place long after the listing
date are most likely "distressed", because the longer a seller waits the more likely he is to become distressed.
Since distressed sales occur at lower prices, the aforementioned negative correlation follows.
This paper belongs to a literature that studies the housing market using search theory, e.g. see Yavas
and Yang [17], Krainer [11], Wheaton [15] and Albrecht et al. [1], among others. We di¤er from the
aforementioned papers in that we focus on distressed sales and predation. The paper by Albrecht et al.
is perhaps the closest to our model in terms of motivation and setup; however it is based on complete
information. This di¤erence is crucial because incomplete information is key in obtaining the predation
result.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and explains how to solve it; Section 3
discusses re sales and predation; Section 4 discusses list price trajectories and price dispersion; Section 5 is
devoted to liquidity; Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Time is continuous and innite. The economy consists of a continuum of risk neutral buyers and sellers. Each
seller is endowed with a house and each buyer seeks to purchase one. Buyers and sellers di¤er in terms of
their intrinsic preferences towards ownership of a house, which creates the incentive to trade. For simplicity
we assume that the utility to the seller from keeping the house is zero. Buyers on the other hand receive
periodic dividends (housing services) starting the period after the purchase of the house and continuing
forever. Following the asset pricing interpretation we assume that the value of a house is captured by the
discounted sum of the future dividends.
Sellerspersonal circumstances may change for worse if they are unable to sell for too long. All sellers
enter the market in regular circumstances, though, eventually as they are unable to sell they may be hit by
an idiosyncratic shock and become distressed (motivatedin real estate parlance). The adverse shock arrives
at an exogenous Poisson rate  > 0 and may be associated with nancial di¢ culties forcing sellers into early
liquidation, e.g. foreclosure, bankruptcy, divorce, etc. It is sensible to think that  rises during crises or
recessions where sellers are more likely to encounter nancial distress. Regular and distressed sellers di¤er
in terms of their time preferences. Buyers and regular sellers discount future utility by 11+ > 0 whereas
distressed sellers are more impatient and discount the future by 1
1+
< 11+ ; which means that  > : Sellers
do not exit the market until they sell and a distressed seller remains distressed. The parameters of interest
are the frequency of the shock, ; and the severity of the shock, :
Transactions are bilateral and involve a non-trivial search process. At any point in time buyers and
sellers meet each other at a constant Poisson rate  > 0:2 Upon meeting a seller and inspecting the house,
a buyer realizes his own valuation of the house v 2 [0; 1], which is a random draw from a distribution with
cdf F (v) : Buyers are identical in the sense that their valuations are generated by the same random process,
however they may di¤er in their valuations for any particular house. This specication captures the notion
that di¤erent buyers have di¤erent tastes and preferences and therefore will have di¤erent reservation prices.
The realization of v 2 [0; 1] is match specic, so when buyers search they in fact search for a high v: We
assume that v is time invariant; so, once a buyer nds and purchases a house with a su¢ ciently high v then
he continues to enjoy the same v forever. We impose log-concavity on the survival function, which is a crucial
technical assumption to obtain several key results in the paper.3
Assumption 1. The density function F 0 (v) is strictly positive whereas the survival function 1   F is log-
concave, that is
F
02 (v) + F
00
(v) [1  F (v)] > 0; 8v:
The realization of v is unobservable to the seller. The seller only knows the cdf F generating v, so, he
advertises a list price l trading o¤ the probability of sale with revenue. The sale price p (l) depends on the
2What we have in mind is a Pissarides style random matching function where arrival rates are functions of the market
tightness (buyer-seller ratio). Typically one assumes di¤erent measures of buyers and sellers so that arrival rates for buyers and
sellers vary. To avoid excessive parameterization we simply assume equal measures, which means that agents meet each other
with the same rate .
3Log-concavity of the survival function is equivalent to the ratio of the density to the survival being monotone increasing
and many well known distributions including Uniform, Normal, Exponential, 2 satisfy this property. See [3] for more details.
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list price but may involve a non-trivial renegotiation process (more on this later). If agents agree to trade
at price p then the seller receives payo¤ p; the buyer receives dividends v starting at the beginning of the
next period and continuing forever; both agents leave the search market and are replaced by a buyer and a
regular seller. The replacement assumption is standard in the literature; it is needed to maintain stationarity.
Agents who do not trade receive a period payo¤ of zero and continue to the next round to play the same
game.
Sale Prices. In the housing market transactions rarely occur at the list price; the sale price typically
involves a hard bargain between the buyer and the seller. To model negotiations the literature traditionally
makes use of Nash bargaining or Rubinstein bargaining frameworks. Instead, we take the following approach.
We are not particularly interested how buyers and sellers interact with each other as they negotiate, so we
treat the renegotiation mechanism (be it Nash bargaining, strategic bargaining or even some esoteric price
formation procedure) as a black box; however, we specify some mild properties that the resulting sale price
ought to satisfy. As long as the renegotiation mechanism satises these properties our results go through.
More formally, let G hl; i denote an extensive form game that induces some expected sale price p (l) :
[0; 1]! [0; 1] for any given list price l and contact frequency .
Assumption 2. The sale price p (l) : [0; 1]! [0; 1] is an increasing and di¤erentiable function of l. The
di¤erential dp=dl is uniquely valued at any l 2 [0; 1] ; i.e. p () is a "smooth" function with no kinks.
If G hl; i has multiple equilibria and therefore generates multiple sale prices (which typically is the case
with bargaining models with private information, e.g. see the survey by Kennan and Wilson [9] and the
references therein), then we assume that there is an equilibrium selection device that uniquely pins down
p (l) : The game, the selection device and the resulting sale price function p (l) are all common knowledge.
a b c
Figure 1: Sale Prices
The restrictions are indeed mild; hence, the model admits a continuum of sale price functions. The gure
illustrates some examples. Figure 1a depicts an environment where the transaction takes place 10% below
the list price, i.e. p = 0:9l: In 1b the sale price almost always exceeds the list price much as the real estate
market in Santa Monica, CA. In 1c the sale price is above or below the list price depending on how much
sellers ask for. The house is sold above the list price if the list price is low and it is sold below the list price
otherwise
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We admit that the shape of the sale price function should be endogenous and should depend on the
fundamentals of the market. The papers purpose, however, is not to explain why a certain pricing practice
emerges in this market and not in the other. Instead we want to investigate what happens to prices, the
volume of trade, and above all, buyers purchasing behavior when some sellers become distressed. For this
purpose the shape of the sale price function can be as it may; all we need is that it satises Assumption 2.
We move on to discuss buyersand sellersproblems. We denote a sellers type by j = r; d where r refers
to regular sellers and d refers to distressed sellers. We focus on a symmetric steady state equilibrium where
identical agents follow identical strategies. In particular, a type j seller advertise a list price lj corresponding
to the sale price p (lj) := pj : Buyers, upon meeting a type j seller, purchase if their private valuation v
(willingness to pay) of the house exceeds an endogenous threshold vj :
2.1 BuyersProblem
The problem of a representative buyer has a recursive formulation. We use a dynamic programming approach
letting 
 denote the value of search to a buyer. In a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium the distribution
of list prices p = (pr ; p

d) is degenerate. Clearly 
 is a function of p
 however we omit the argument when
understood. We have

 = 
Z 1
0
max
hv

  ps   
; 0
i
dF (v) +  (1  )
Z 1
0
max
hv

  pr   
; 0
i
dF (v) :
A buyers lifetime utility from owning a house that yields v per period equals to v=. The parameter
 is the endogenous fraction of distressed sellers; so with probability  a buyer meets a distressed seller
who sells for pd: If the consumer surplus v=   pd exceeds the value of search 
 then the buyer purchases,
otherwise he walks away. Similarly with probability  (1  ) the buyer encounters a regular seller who sells
for pr: Again if the consumer surplus exceeds the value of search then the buyer purchases otherwise he keeps
searching.
For any given sale price pj we conjecture an associated reservation value
vj =  (pj +
) (1)
such that the customer purchases only if v  vj : The implication is that a buyerssearch process amounts
to nding a house with a su¢ ciently high v. Obviously not all meetings result in trade; for trade to occur
the house must turn out to be a good match for the buyer, which happens with probability F (1  vj). A
high vj means that buyers are unlikely to purchase (they are selective).
Observe that there are two types of trading frictions in the model. The rst is locating a vacant house,
which is captured by the meeting probability ; and the second is whether the house, once found, is a good
match, which is captured by the probability F (1  vj) : Clearly, in our model liquidity is endogenous and it
is derived from the maximization behavior of buyers and sellers.4
4The fact that some meetings do not result in trade is in line with the empirical observation by Merlo and Ortalo-Magné [12].
Analyzing transaction histories of residential properties sold in England between 1995 and 1998 they nd that about a third of
all meetings resolve with no agreement. Most of the existing theoretical models of the housing market are in clear contradiction
with this empirical observation. e.g. Arnold [2], Chen and Rosenthal [6], Yavas [16], Yavas and Yang [17]. Assuming complete
information, these models imply that a match necessarily results in trade.
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Inserting the reservation values into 
 we have

 =

2
Z 1
vd
(v   vs) dF (v) +  (1  )
2
Z 1
vr
(v   vr) dF (v)
=

2
Z 1
vd
[1  F (v)] dv +  (1  )
2
Z 1
vr
[1  F (v)] dv; (2)
where in the second step we use integration by parts.
The Fraction of Distressed Sellers. The steady state fraction of distressed sellers is endogenous
and can be obtained by equating the inow into the pool of distressed sellers to the outow from the pool.
The inow equals to (1  ) whereas the outow is F (1  vd) : Therefore
 =

+ F (1  vd) 2 (0; 1) : (3)
Observe that  depends on the arrival rate of the adverse shock, ; and the meeting probability . It is easy
to see that  rises in  and falls in : More importantly  depends on the probability of trade F (1  vd)
which is endogenous and controlled by buyers. Observe that buyers can squeeze the outow and raise 
by becoming more selective (i.e. by raising the threshold vd). Put di¤erently, buyers can strategically slow
down the speed of trade and thereby cause more sellers to become distressed. This observation is essential
in understanding the predation result.
Lemma 1 We have @
@vd < 0 and
@

@vr
< 0:
The Lemma has two implications. First, buyersvalue of search falls as the market becomes less liquid,
i.e. 
 falls as vr and vd go up. The other implication is that sellers face a trade-o¤ between revenue and
liquidity. Indeed the indi¤erence condition (1) implies that
dvj
dpj
=

1  @
=@vj > 0;
which basically means that the higher the price the higher the threshold vj . From the sellers perspective,
raising the sale price pj (by advertising a higher lj) brings in a larger revenue but lowers the chance of a
sale. The sellers task is to nd a balance between these two e¤ects, which we discuss next.
2.2 The Sellers Problem
A type j seller advertises a list price lj taking as given the sale price function p () and buyers search
decisions. The value functions are given by
d =  [1  F (vd)]max (pd  d; 0) (4)
r =  [1  F (vr)]max (pr  r; 0) +  (d  r) : (5)
An interpretation is this. A distressed seller who lists ld (and consequently sells for pd) meets a buyer
with probability , who purchases with probability 1   F (vd). The seller agrees to trade only if the price
exceeds his continued value of search i.e. if pd  d  0. The second line can be interpreted similarly.
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Conjecturing that pj  j , a type j seller solves
max
lj
j s.t. vj =  (pj +
s)
taking 
 as given5 . The value functions are linked to each other and therefore it requires some algebra to
solve the maximization problems. A complete analysis is provided in Appendix I; here we simply record
some key steps. The FOC of seller j is given by
pj  j = 1  F (vj)
F 0 (vj)
; j = r; d:
Using the FOC and manipulating the value functions with straightforward algebra one can obtain the prot
maximizing sale prices for regular and distressed sellers
pr =
1  F (vr)
F 0 (vr)
+
 [1  F (vr)]2
 (+ )F 0 (vr)
+
 [1  F (vd)]2
 (+ )F 0 (vd)
(6)
pd =
1  F (vd)
F 0 (vd)
+
 [1  F (vd)]2
F 0 (vd)
: (7)
Lemma 2 We have @pd@vd <
@pr
@vd
< 0 and @pr@vr <
@pd
@vr
= 0:
The Lemma has two implications. First, the negative relationship between prices and reservation values
reect the aforementioned trade-o¤ between revenue and liquidity. For low values of vj the probability of a
sale is high, so sellers can a¤ord to charge high prices; however as vj rises, liquidity concerns start to kick
in and prices fall. Second, a type j seller is more sensitive to his probability of sale than the other type is,
which is why @pd@vd <
@pr
@vd
and @pr@vr <
@pd
@vr
:
Now we are ready to close down the model.
Denition 3 A steady-state symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the sale price function p (l) and the
pairs v = (vr ; v

d) and l
 = (lr ; l

d) that simultaneously satisfy
r := pr +
  vr

= 0 and d := pd +
  vd

: (8)
The fraction of distressed sellers , given by (3) and also implicitly part of the equilibrium, can be easily
recovered from the conditions above.
Existence (and uniqueness) of an equilibrium amounts to showing that there exists an interior pair
v = (vr ; v

d) satisfying (8). To do so one needs to demonstrate that the locuses of r and d intersect
once in the vr   vd space. Lemma 7 in Appendix II establishes that the locuses look as in Figure 2. The
fact that r is steeper than d and the specic locations of the boundaries (vd; vr etc.) guarantee a unique
intersection.
5From the sellers point of view, cutting the price directly improves the buyers willingness to trade, but the seller fails to
take into account how this drop changes equilibrium prices and the buyers value of search. This "large market approach" is
used in directed search models as well, e.g. see Camera and Selcuk [5].
7
0 1
0
1
vr
vd
_
vd
vr
_
vr
_
vd
Kd
Kr
_
2a
0 1
0
1
vr
Kr_
vd
vr
__
vd
vd
vd
_
Kd
_
2b
Figure 2: Locuses6
3 Fire Sales and Predation
Proposition 4 A steady state symmetric equilibrium exists and it is unique. The equilibrium is characterized
by "re sales": desperate sellers accept lower prices and sell faster than regular sellers i.e. pd < p

r and
vd < v

r : If the adverse shock starts to arrive more often then "predatory buying" emerges: prices fall yet
buyers hold o¤ purchasing and strategically slow down the trade i.e. dpj=d < 0 and dv

j =d > 0. Finally, if
the shock becomes more severe then prices fall and trade speeds up i.e. dpj=d < 0 and dv

j =d < 0:
The proposition has a number of implications, so we move in steps.
Fire Sales. A distressed home owner is impatient to sell. To achieve his goal he undercuts his competitors,
which we dub as attempting a re sale. The price cut produces the desired outcome. Indeed vd < v

r implies
that distressed home owners are more likely to sell than regular home owners. How low the price can go
depends on fast the seller needs to unload the property, which in turn depends on how dire the situation of
the seller is. The facts that dpd=d < 0 and dv

d=d < 0 imply that the more painful the shock the lower
the price and the quicker the trade. The simulation in Figure 5c provides further insight on this, where we
plot a distressed sellers (percentage wise) prot loss against the severity of the shock : The prot loss is
measured by the index
z =
pr   pd
pr
2 (0; 1) :
Had the seller not become distressed he would have been able to sell at pr but in a re sale he can only get
pd; so the di¤erence p

r pd equals to his forgone prots. A high value of z means that distressed sellers need
to o¤er substantial price cuts in order to sell quickly. Observe that in Fig 5c if the shock is mild (  )
then there is not much di¤erence between what regular and distressed sellers charge, however as the shock
starts to bite (  ), then distressed sellers face considerable losses. We will come back to this point later
in Section 5 when we discuss liquidity.
There is a particular study by Glower et al. [8] that we would like to mention here. The papers goal
is to determine the e¤ects of seller motivation on prices, the time on the market, the speed of trade, etc.
To do so the authors survey sellers in Columbus, OH area to obtain information on their motivation by
asking whether they have a planned date to move out or accepted a job o¤er elsewhere or bought another
6Both gures are drawn for F (v) = v, p (l) = l, and  = 1: In 2a we have  = 0:9;  = 1:2 and  = 2: In 2b we have  = 0:05;
 = 0:2 and  = 0:5:
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house. The conclusion is that motivated sellers accept lower prices and sell more quickly. This seems to be
consistent with the preceding discussion.
Predatory Buying. The proposition says that during periods where an increasing number of sellers
become distressed i.e. when  goes up the followings happen (it is sensible to think that the adverse shock,
; arrives more often during nancial crises or recessions):
 All sellers, regular and distressed, accept lower prices, i.e. dpj=d < 0: Regular sellers face a higher
likelihood of becoming distressed in the future. So, they accept lower prices to sell quickly before being
hit by the shock, which is why dpr=d < 0. We call this the "spill-over e¤ect" of distressed sales on
regular sales. Desperate sellers, on the other hand, face sti¤er competition. The fraction of desperate
sellers  rises with , so, realizing that there many other sellers in the same dire situation, distressed
sellers are forced to cut their already low prices. This is why dpd=d < 0:
 Customers exhibit what we call predatory buying ; they delay purchasing and strategically slow down
the speed of trade (i.e. dvj =d > 0) despite the falling prices. The reason is that, unlike sellers, buyers
benet from the rising :7 Realizing that there are plenty of good deals in the market (higher ) buyers
nd it optimal to search longer, which means that they increase the thresholds vr and v

d. This response
has a spiral e¤ect. By raising vd buyers strategically slow down the speed of trade causing more sellers
to become distressed (recall that  rises with vd). The growing  puts additional downward pressure
on prices and the speed of trade, and so on.
From the buyerspoint of view predatory buying is optimal as it allows them to acquire better houses
at lower prices, but from the sellerspoint of view predation is the worst possible outcome; they are forced
to lower their prices yet buyers are still reluctant to purchase. Indeed liquidity disappears when it is needed
the most.
Predatory trading is well documented in nancial markets; see, for instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen
[4] and the references therein.8 Casual observations suggest that in the real estate market, too, various forms
of predation take place including strategically delaying purchasing to pressurize distressed home owners.
Newspaper stories are abound about potential buyers delaying their purchase and waiting for the right
timeto enter the market. The number of such stories seems to have escalated during the recent housing
crisis, where presumably the arrival rate of the adverse shock  went up. Although somewhat casual, these
observations seem to be consistent with the implications of the model. To the best of our knowledge predation
is not empirically documented in the real estate market.
4 Prices
4.1 Price Trajectories
According to the model, for any given property the trajectory of the list price is either at or looks like a step
function with a sizeable jump-down at the time of the price reduction. To see why note that all sellers enter
the market in the regular state; so all properties are initially listed at high prices (lr in the model). Some
7Buyersvalue of search 
 increases in : To see why note that in the proof of Proposition 4 we establish that 
 > 0: Since
 > 0 it follows that 
 > 0:
8Brunnermeier and Pedersen [4] who show that in nancial markets if a distressed trader is forced to liquidate, other strategic
traders initially sell in the same direction driving down the price even faster and then buy it back at dirt cheap prices.
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sellers manage to sell without being distressed; so for those properties the trajectory remains at throughout.
Others, however, are hit by the adverse shock while still waiting to sell, so they reduce their prices from lr
to ld when the shock hits. These properties have list price trajectories that look like a step function.
Interestingly, this is exactly what Merlo and Ortalo-Magné [12] observe empirically. Based on home sale
transaction data from England, they nd that 2/3 of sellers do not change their list price, 1/4 reduce only
once, and the rest reduce twice or more. The individual list price trajectories are either at or piecewise at
with typically one discontinuous jump-down (see Figure 2.1 in Merlo et al. [13]). Sellers wait, on average, 11
weeks to change their prices and the price reductions can be as high as 10%. These sizeable and infrequent
price revisions are inconsistent with most of the existing theoretical literature. Existing models imply that
in equilibrium, either the seller never revises the price (e.g., Arnold [2], Chen and Rosenthal [6], Yavas and
Yang [17]), or gradually lowers the price in a continuous fashion (Coles [7]).
Our model, however, naturally accounts for the preceding empirical observations. Regular sellers do not
modify the listing price whereas distressed sellers reduce the price only when the shock hits. The drop can
be sizeable ( 8%) if the shock is severe, see Fig. 5c. Finally, observe that in our setup the shock hits only
once, hence the price drop occurs only once. One can easily cast the model in a setting where there are
multiple levels of being distressed, so price drops may occur once, twice or more, as Merlo and Ortalo-Magné
observe.
4.2 The Negative Relationship between Duration and the Expected Sale Price
Merlo and Ortalo-Magné [12] document a negative correlation between the sale price and the duration of
the sale (the longer the time on the market the lower the sale price). This fact, again, is inconsistent with
most of the existing theoretical models. Our setup, instead, provides a simple explanation: If a property is
sold shortly after the listing date then it is most likely a "regular sale". The owner of the property cannot
possibly become distressed within this short period of time. On the other hand if the sale occurs long after
the listing date then most likely it is a "distressed sale". Indeed, the longer the wait the more likely is a seller
to be hit by the shock. The negative correlation between the sale price and duration immediately follows
from the fact that distressed sales occur at lower prices. Below we make these arguments more precise.
Consider a seller who enters the market at time 0 (wlog). The probability that he remains non-distressed
without a sale until time t is given by
r (t) = e (+r)t: (9)
The probability that he becomes distressed at some time y  t while he is still unable to sell at t equals to
d (t) =
Z t
0
e ye rye d(t y)dy; (10)
where e y is the density of transition time y (exponential pdf). Now, consider all sales completed with a
duration t: The fraction of distressed sales equals to
g (t) =
d (t)
r (t) + d (t)
:
One can easily verify that g rises in t (see the proof of Proposition 5), i.e., the longer the duration, the more
likely the sellers are to be distressed. An immediate corollary is that the expected sale price falls with the
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duration. To see this more precisely dene the expected sale price
p (t) = gpd + (1  g) pr
and the variance
2 (t) = g (pd   p (t))2 + (1  g) (pr   p (t))2 :
Proposition 5 p (t) is monotone decreasing and 2 (t) is hump-shaped in t:
Figure 3a and 3b illustrate p and . Observe that limt!0 p (t) ! pr  0:43 and limt!1 p (t) ! pd 
0:41: Indeed, as stated above, if a house is sold very soon after it was put on sale then most likely it
is not a distressed sale, because there is not su¢ cient time where the seller could be possibly hit by the
shock. However the longer it stays on the market, the more likely the seller is to become distressed. The
continuously downward slope in p may be somewhat misleading and create an illusion that the transaction
price continuously falls with the duration. We emphasize that an individual transaction price trajectory is
piecewise at with a discontinuous drop from pr to p

d at the time the seller is hit by the shock. It is the
expected price that falls monotonically; the transaction price is either pr or p

d:
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Figure 3 : Exp. Sale Price and the St. Dev. wrt Duration9
The shape of the standard deviation is also intuitive. For very short or very long durations the sale is
either non-distressed or distressed. Only for intermediate values of t there is ambiguity; hence the hump
shape.
4.3 Price Dispersion
The model implies equilibrium price dispersion (in list prices as well as in sale prices). The source of price
dispersion is the fact that sellers are heterogenous in terms of their time preferences: distressed sellers
cannot wait, so they accept lower prices; regular sellers, on the other hand, are more patient, hence they
fetch higher prices. Below we obtain the distribution of sale prices and discuss how it responds to the
parameters of interest,  and :
9Parameters: F (v) = v, p (l) = l,  = 1;  = 0:5;  = 0:05;  = 0:2:
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The distribution of list and sale prices follows from the steady state fraction of distressed sellers, . At
any given point in time we have
Pr (l = ld) =  and Pr (l = l

r) = 1  :
The distribution of sale prices is same as above. Now we can obtain the average sale price and the variance
p = pd + (1  ) pr and 2 =  (pd   p)2 + (1  ) (pr   p)2 :
One can easily verify that p falls in  and  (see also Figures 4a and 4b).10 There are two channels through
which these parameters a¤ect p: First, pd and p

r fall in  and  (Proposition 4). Second,  rises in  and
. Both of these e¤ects work in the same direction; hence the average sale price unambiguously falls if the
shock becomes more severe or more frequent.
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Figure 4 : Av. Sale Price and St. Deviation Cross Section
The shape of the standard deviation is also intuitive (Figure 4c and 4d). If  is too low then almost all sales
are regular; if  is too high then almost all sales are distressed; in either case there is little dispersion. Only
for moderate values of  we have price dispersion. Figure 4d illustrates  with respect to : If  =  = 0:05
then sellers are identical and charge the same price; hence there is no dispersion. However as  rises, the gap
between pr and p

d widens and price dispersion starts to appear, which is why  rises in :
5 Liquidity
The working denition of liquidity in this paper is the capacity of how fast one can sell his property without
any loss in value. There are two aspects of liquidity that we are interested in: the speed of trade and the
prot loss in re sales. The former can be measured either by the probability of sale
j = 

1  F  vj 
or the expected time on the market TOM . The probability of sale measures the speed of trade from an
individual sellers point of view, whereas TOM is a market-wide weighted average taking into account all
sellers, regular and distressed.
10Observe that
dp
d
=   (pr   pd)
d
d
+ 
dpd
d
+ (1  ) dp

r
d
:
The rst term is negative because  > 0 and pr > pd: The second and the third terms are also negative because dp

d=d < 0
and dpr=d < 0: Similarly one can show that dp=d < 0:
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The second aspect of liquidity is the loss of value in re sales. To measure it we use the index
z =
pr   pd
pr
2 (0; 1) ; (11)
which is a distressed sellers percentage-wise prot loss compared to a regular seller. The index z has been
introduced earlier; we rewrite it here for clarity. Recall that a high value of z means that distressed sales
occur far below regular sales, which indicates illiquidity. Below we discuss the performance of these proxies
within the context of re sales and predation.
5.1 Time on the Market: TOM
The time on the market is one of the most frequently used and referred statistics in the literature. Low
values of TOM is typically interpreted as an indication of high liquidity and market e¢ ciency (e.g. Krainer
[11], Knight [10] ) or, in a slightly di¤erent context, as a sign of the quality of the property (Taylor [14]). In
our model, though, TOM does a poor job as a proxy of liquidity. We show that TOM falls as the adverse
shock  arrives more frequently. When interpreted on the face value, the fall in TOM indicates that the
market becomes more liquid and more e¢ cient during times of nancial distress where a rising number of
sellers become distressed and attempt re sales.
To see why, notice that during periods when  goes up customers exhibit predation, so the probability
of trade j falls for both types of sellers. In such a setting one naturally expects TOM to go up because
sellers wait longer until a sale occurs; but things are more subtle than that. Because of the rising  more
sellers become distressed and distressed sellers trade faster than regular sellers. This transition e¤ect puts a
downward pressure on TOM and blurs the picture: Simulations suggest that the transition e¤ect is in fact
dominant; that is TOM falls as the adverse shock arrives more frequently; see Figure 5b. Below we make
these arguments more precise.
Using r(t) and d(t), which are given by (9) and (10), one can obtain the density of time to sale  and
the expected time to sale TOM . We have
TOM =
Z 1
0
[r (t) + d (t)] dt and  =  d [r (t) + d (t)]
dt
:
Basic algebra reveals that TOM and  are given by the expressions below.
Proposition 6 The density of the time on the market is given by
 =
de
 dt   (d   r) (+ r) e (+r)t
  d + r : (12)
The pdf is hump shaped if  >
[1 F (vr )]2
F (vr ) F(vd)
and monotone decreasing otherwise. The expected time on the
market is given by
TOM =
+  [1  F (vd)]
 [1  F (vd)] (+  [1  F (vr )])
:
The pdf  and the expected time on the market TOM are both endogenous and derived from the
maximization behavior of buyers and sellers. Both expressions depend on the parameters of the model as
well as the equilibrium objects vr and v

d:
11 Now we can analyze how TOM responds to a change in . We
11The shape of the density function  is indeed realistic (Figure 5a illustrates ). Merlo et al. [13], based on transaction data
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have
dTOM
d
=
@TOM
@vr
dvr
d
+
@TOM
@vd
dvd
d
+
@TOM
@
:
The rst two terms are positive because @TOM=dvj > 0 and dv

j =d > 0 (Proposition 4). When  rises
sellers are less likely to trade, so they wait longer until a sale occurs: The last term, however, is negative
because
@TOM
@
/ F (vd)  F (vr ) < 0 since vd < vr ;
conrming our intuition about the aforementioned transition e¤ect. Analytically it is di¢ cult to sign
dTOM=d but simulations suggest that the transition e¤ect is in fact more dominant; see Figure 5b.
As discussed above, if one relies on TOM as a proxy of liquidity, then the fall in TOM means that the
market becomes more liquid during times of nancial distress. It appears that in this particular setting the
equilibrium probability of trade j = 

1  F  vj  is a better proxy of liquidity than TOM . In data j is
the frequency of meetings resulting in a sale, which clearly falls with 12 ; indicating that during recessions
or crises liquidity dries up as meetings are less likely to result in trade.
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Figure 5: The pdf ; the time on the market TOM and the prot loss z13
5.2 Prot Loss: z
Figure 5c illustrates z against the frequency () and the severity
 


of the adverse shock. Note that when
  0 distressed sales take place about 14% below regular sales, whereas when   0:5 the di¤erence is less
than 5%. In general the simulation suggests that attempting a re sale is, in fact, less costly when times are
bad (when  is high). The reason is simple. During bad times regular sellers, afraid of becoming distressed,
substantially lower their prices to sell quickly and exit the market. This is the aforementioned spillover e¤ect
of re sales onto the regular sales. Regular sellers are more sensitive to a rise in  than distressed sellers
are. Distressed sellers do not worry about being hit by the shock because they are already distressed. So,
although both prices fall; the drop in pr is sharper than the one in p

d which is why z declines.
from England, obtain the empirical distribution of times to sale, which is right skewed and hump-shaped with a mean 10.27
weeks and median of 6 weeks (see gure 2.3 therein). The theoretical pdf is skewed to the right because of the Poisson arrivals
and it may be hump shaped if the ratio = is su¢ ciently large, i.e. if buyers are scarce and the adverse shock is frequent.
12Observe that
dj
d
=  F

vj

dvj
d
< 0:
13All gures are drawn for F (v) = v; p (l) = l,  = 1,  = 0:05;  = 0:2;  = 0:5: In 5b and 5c the x-axis is shared by 
and . When plotting with respect to  we x  = 0:5 and let  range between 0.05 and 0.5 on the x-axis (recall that we need
 >  = 0:05): Similarly when plotting with respect to  we x  = 0:2.
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Again, one has to be careful when interpreting this rather positive-looking result. In absolute terms all
sellers are worse o¤ (all prices fall in ): Only in relative terms distressed sellers appear to be better o¤.
The relationship between z and  is more straightforward. The simulation in Figure 5c suggests that if
the shock is mild (  ) then a re sale is not too costly; however as the shock starts to bite (  ), then
distressed sellers face considerable losses. Indeed when  =  = 0:05 sellers are identical and charge the same
price, so z = 0; but when  = 0:5 the price di¤erence exceeds 8%. The reason is that desperate sellers are
directly a¤ected by a rise in  whereas regular sellers worry about  only because they may become desperate
in the future. The fall in pd is sharper than the one in p

r ; which is why z goes up:
6 Conclusion
We have presented an equilibrium search model with three distinctive characteristics: (i) trade is decen-
tralized; agents search for a counterparty to trade (ii) a buyers willingness to pay is private information
and (iii) sellers may become nancially distressed as they are unable to sell. We have found that, once
distressed, sellers attempt re sales by accepting prices that are substantially below fundamental values. In
addition, during periods where a large number of sellers are forced to liquidate customers strategically hold
o¤ purchasing and slow down the speed of trade in an e¤ort to obtain better deals an outcome which we
call predatory or vulture buying.
When constructing the model what we had in mind was the housing market, however we think that
the results should hold in other markets featuring the aforementioned characteristics. For instance the
model is also relevant to the over the counter (OTC) markets; in particular markets for mortgage-backed
securities, bank loans and derivatives among others. Indeed, search is a fundamental feature in many OTC
markets as it is di¢ cult to identify a counterparty with whom there are likely gains from trade. In these
markets buyers valuations are private information; it is not uncommon at all for parties to simply walk away
without trading. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that traders may become nancially distressed due to,
for instance, pressing debt obligations, nearing margin calls, hedging motives or being caught in a "short
squeeze". The labor market is another setting where the model is applicable.
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Appendix I: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Observe that  does not depend on vr: Hence
@

@vr
=   (1  )

[1  F (vr)] ;
which clearly is negative: Now consider
@

@vd
=
0

Z vr
vs
[1  F (v)] dv   

[1  F (vd)] ; (13)
where
0 =
@
@vd
=
F 0 (vd)
+  [1  F (vd)] > 0:
To show that @
=@vd < 0 it su¢ ces to demonstrate that
 (vd) :=
Z 1
vd
[1  F (v)] dv   

1  F (vd)
F 0 (vd)
  [1  F (vd)]
2
F 0 (vd)
< 0:
Omitting the argument and di¤erentiating with respect to vd we have
0 =
F 02 + F 00 (1  F )
F 02
h

+ 1  F
i
which is positive under Assumption 1: Since  increases in vd and  (1) = 0; it follows that  (vd) < 0,
8vd 2 [0; 1): 
Maximization Problems of Distressed and Regular Sellers
Distressed Sellers. We start with the distressed sellersproblem. Note the followings:
 The sale price p is a function of l; pj simply stands for p (lj) : Because of Assumption 2 we have
p0j = @p=@lj > 0: Since p does not have any kinks the derivative p
0 is uniquely valued for all lj :
 The indi¤erence constraint vd =  (pd +
) implies that v0d = @vd=@ld = p0d > 0:
 Sellers take 
 as given, thus 
0 = @
=@ld = 0:
Conjecturing that pd  d rewrite (4) as follows
d =  [1  F (vd)] (pd  d) :
Keeping the preceding points in mind di¤erentiate d with respect to ld to obtain
0d =  F 0 (vd) p0d (pd  d) +  [1  F (vd)] (p0d  0d) :
The FOC is given by
0s;d = 0) pd  d =
1  F (vd)
F 0 (vd)
: (14)
Substitute the FOC into the expression for d to obtain
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d =
 [1  F (vd)]2
F 0 (vd)
: (15)
Expressions (14) and (15) together imply that pd equals to the expression on display at (7). To verify the
second order condition, note that


00d =  2F 00 (vd) p02d (pd  d)  F 0 (vd) p00d (pd  d)  F 0 (vd) p0d (p0d  0d)
 p0dF 0 (vd) (p0d  0d) + [1  F (vd)] (p00d  00d) :
Substitute 0d = 0 and use (14) to obtain (we omit the argument vd where understood):
00d =  
p02d

 + 1  F
 2F
0 [1  F ]F 00
F 0
:
The rst multiplicative term is clearly positive, whereas the second term is positive because of log-concavity:
It follows that 00 < 0; thus the solution to the rst order condition yields a maximum.
Regular Sellers. The problem of a regular seller is similar. We have
r =  [1  F (vr)] (vr   
 r) +  [d  r] : (16)
Di¤erentiate r with respect to lr to obtain the rst-order condition (imposing 
0 = 0d = 0 since they are
taken as given):
0r = 0, pr  r =
1  F (vr)
F 0 (vr)
: (17)
The second order condition can be veried similarly.
Use (15), (16) and (17) to get
r =
 [1  F (vr)]2
 (+ )F 0 (vr)
+
 [1  F (vd)]2
 (+ )F 0 (vd)
:
Substitute r into (17) to obtain the o¤er curve of a regular seller, given by (6). 
Proof of Lemma 2.
Di¤erentiate pr and pd; given by (6) and (7), with respect to vr and vd to obtain:
@pr
@vr
=  F
02
r + F
00
r (1  Fr)
F 022
   (1  Fr)
 (+ )

2F 02r + F
00
r (1  Fr)
F 02r

< 0; (18)
@pr
@vd
=   (1  Fd)
 (+ )

2F 02d + F
00
d (1  Fd)
F 02d

< 0;
@pd
@vr
= 0; (19)
@pd
@vd
=  F
02
d + F
00
d (1  Fd)
F 02d
   (1  Fd)


2F 02d + F
00
d (1  Fd)
F 02d

< 0; (20)
where Fj := F (vj). The expression
@pr
@vr
; @pr@vd and
@pd
@vd
are negative because of log-concavity. The fact that
@pd
@vd
< @pr@vd is immediate after comparing them term by term. 
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Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of existence and uniqueness is relegated to Appendix II. Below we
prove the rest of the claims in the proposition.
Fire Sales. We will show that vr > v

d and p

r > p

d: Suppose v

r = v

d = v and notice that
r (v; v) d (v; v) =

 
   
 (+ )
 [1  F (v)]
2
F 0 (v)
> 0;
which contradicts the equilibrium condition r (vr ; v

d) d (vr ; vd) = 0: Observe that
@ (r  d)
@vr
=
@pr
@vr
  1

  @pd
@vr
< 0
because @pr@vr < 0 and
@pd
@vr
= 0 (Lemma 2). It follows that r (vr ; v

d) = d (v

r ; v

d) is satised only when
vr > v

d: The inequality p

r > p

d is immediate since p

r   pd = (vr   vd) = > 0.
For future reference note that
pr   pd =
1  Fr
F 0r
  1  Fd
F 0d
+

(+ )
"
(1  Fr)2
F 0r
  (1  Fd)
2
F 0d
#
> 0: (21)
Comparative Statics. The equilibrium values of vr and v

d simultaneously satisfy
r (v

r ; v

d) = 0 and d (v

r ; v

d) = 0:
Omit the superscript  and note that (General Implicit Function Theorem)
dvj
du
=
detBj (u)
detA
; for any u = ;  and j = r; d;
where
Br (u) =
"
 @r@u @r@vd
 @d@u @d@vd
#
; Bd (u) =
"
@r
@vr
 @r@u
@d
@vr
 @d@u
#
; A =
"
@r
@vr
@r
@vd
@d
@vr
@d
@vd
#
:
Note that
detA =
@r
@vr
@d
@vd
  @d
@vr
@r
@vd
> 0
since
@r
@vr
<
@d
@vr
< 0 and
@d
@vd
<
@r
@vd
< 0 (see (22) and (23)):
It follows that
sign

@vj
@u

= sign (detBj (u)) :
Below we investigate the signs of the determinants. To do so we need the following partial derivatives.
Partial Derivatives. Here we obtain the partial derivatives of 
; pd and pr with respect to  and : To start,
di¤erentiate 
; given by (2), to obtain
@

@
= 0 and
@

@
=
2 [1  Fd]
2
Z vr
vd
[1  F (v)] dv > 0:
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Notice that @
@ is positive since v

r > v

d. Now di¤erentiate pr and pd; given by (6) and (7), to obtain
@pd
@
=   [1  Fd]
2

2
F 0d
< 0,
@pr
@
=

(+ )
@pd
@
< 0
@pd
@
= 0;
@pr
@
=   
(+ )
2
"
(1  Fr)2
F 0r
  (1  Fd)
2
F 0d
#
< 0.
Note that F 0j and Fj stand for F
0  vj  and F  vj . The signs of the rst three expressions are obvious. To
see why @pr@ < 0 focus on the inequality above in (21) and notice that
@pr
@ is negative if in (21) the expression
in square brackets is positive. The term
1  Fr
F 0r
  1  Fd
F
0
d
in (21) is negative because (1  F ) =F 0 decreases in v (log-concavity) and vr > vd. Therefore the expression
in square brackets in (21) must be positive.
Reserve Values vr and v

d. Now we can investigate the signs of dv

j =d and dv

j =d: To do so we need to
determine the signs of detBj
 


and detBj () :
 Since @
=@ = 0 we have
detBd
 


=
@d
@vr
@pr
@
  @r
@vr
@pd
@
:
Furthermore, since
@pd
@
<
@pr
@
< 0 and
@r
@vr
<
@d
@vr
< 0
it follows that detBd
 


< 0 =) dvd=d < 0:
 Because @pd=@ = 0 we have
detBd () =
@d
@vr
@pr
@
+
@

@

@d
@vr
  @r
@vr

:
Since
@pr
@
< 0;
@

@
> 0 and
@r
@vr
<
@d
@vr
< 0
it follows that detBd () > 0 =) dvd=d > 0:
 Since
@pr
@
=

+ 
@pd
@
< 0 and
@

@
= 0
it is easy to verify that
detBr
 


=
@pd
@

@pr
@vd
  
+ 
@pd
@vd
+

+ 
@

@vd
+

+ 

:
The expressions for @
@vd ;
@pr
@vd
and @pd@vd are given by (13), (18) and (20). Using these, one can show that
the expression inside the square brackets equals to

+ 
F 02d + F
00
d (1  Fd)
F 02d
+
0
+ 
Z vr
vd
[1  F (v)] dv + 
+ 
> 0:
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The rst term is positive because of log-concavity and the second term is positive since 0 > 0 and
vr > v

d: It follows that detBr
 


< 0 =) dvr=d < 0:
 Recalling @pd=@ = 0 we obtain
detBr () =
@

@

@r
@vd
  @d
@vd

+
@d
@vd
@pr
@
:
The rst term is positive since
@d
@vd
<
@r
@vd
< 0 and
@

@
> 0:
The second term is also positive since @d=@vd < 0 and @pr=@ < 0. It follows that detBr () >
0 =) dvr=d > 0:
Finally, we investigate the signs of dpj=d and dp

j=d:
Prices. Totally di¤erentiating pj with respect to  one obtains
dpj
d
=
@pj
@
+
@pj
@vr
dvr
d
+
@pj
@vd
dvd
d
:
Recall that
@pr
@
<
@pd
@
= 0;
@pj
@vr
 0; @pj
@vd
< 0 and
dvj
d
> 0:
Hence dpj=d < 0: To show dpj=d < 0; recall that pj = vj= 
 in equilibrium. Di¤erentiation with respect
to  yields
dpj
d
=
dvj
d
  @

@vr
dvr
d
  @

@vd
dvd
d
;
which is negative since dvj=d < 0 and @
=@vj < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Notice that
dp (t)
dt
=  dg (t)
dt
(pr   pd)
One can verify that
dg (t)
dt
/ e (d+r+) > 0:
It follows that p0 < 0 since pr > p

d: Finally note that
d2
dt
= (pr   pd) [g0 (2p  pr   pd) + 2gp0] :
Clearly d2=dt shares the sign of the expression in the square brackets, since pr > p

d. One can verify that
limt!0 g (t) = 0 and limt!1 g (t) = 1 so that limt!0 p (t) = pr and limt!1 p (t) = p

d. It follows that d
2=dt
is positive for t small and negative for t large because g0 > 0 and p0 < 0. In other words 2 rst rises and
subsequently falls with t: 
Proof of Proposition 6. Using r(t) and d(t), given by (9) and (10), one can obtain the density of time
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to sale and the expected time to sale. Evaluating the integral in (10) we have
d (t) =
e dt   r (t)
  d + r :
Note that
TOM =
Z 1
0
[r (t) + d (t)] dt and  =  d [r (t) + d (t)]
dt
:
Basic algebra reveals that TOM and  are given by the expressions on display in Proposition 6. It is easy
to verify that  is positive and that Z 1
0
dt =   [r (t) + d (t)] j10 = 1:
To analyze the shape of  note that
0 =
 2de dt + (d   r) (+ r)2 e (+r)t
  d + r ;
where
d   r =  [F (vr )  F (vd)] > 0 since vr > vd:
Notice that the denominator could be either positive or negative. It follows that:
If  > d   r then 0 (t) > 0, (d   r) (+ r)
2
2d
> e(+r d)t:
If  < d   r then 0 (t) > 0, (d   r) (+ r)
2
2d
< e(+r d)t:
First note that limt!1 0 < 0; i.e.,  is monotone decreasing for t large. Now evaluate limt!0 : Note that
in the rst line the exponential term is minimum when t = 0 whereas in the second line it is maximum when
t = 0. Hence
0 (0) > 0 if


>
[1  F (vr )]2
F (vr )  F (vd)
:
Clearly if 0 (0) > 0 then  rst rises and then falls (hump-shape). Otherwise if 0 (0) < 0 it falls monotoni-
cally. 
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Appendix II: Existence (not intended for publication)
Let
j (vr) := fvd 2 [0; 1] j j (vr; vd) = 0g
be the locus of j (vr; vd). The following Lemma guarantees that the d and r intersect once in the vr  vd
space. Then using standard arguments we complete the proof of existence.
Lemma 7 The simultaneous equations
r (vr; vd) = pr   vr

+
 and d (vr; vd) = pd   vd

+

dene r and d as implicit and strictly decreasing functions of vr with drdvr <
dd
dvr
< 0: Furthermore there
exists some 0 < vd < vd < 1 and vr 2 (0; 1) such that d (0) = vd, d (1) = vd and r (vr) = 1: Last either
there exists some vr 2 (vr; 1) such that r (vr) = 0 as in Figure 2a or there exists some vd 2 (0; vd) such
that r (1) = vd as in Figure 2b.
Proof. We will rst demonstrate that drdvr <
dd
dvr
and then we will focus on the existence of boundaries
vj ; vj : Notice that
@r
@vr
=
@pr
@vr
  1

+
@

@vr
<
@d
@vr
=
@pd
@vr
+
@

@vr
< 0; (22)
@d
@vd
=
@pd
@vd
  1

+
@

@vd
<
@r
@vd
=
@pr
@vd
+
@

@vd
< 0: (23)
These inequalities follow from the facts that @
@vj < 0 (Lemma 1) and
@pj
@vj
<
@pej
@vj
< 0 (Lemma 2). Therefore
j (vr; vd) = 0 denes vd = j (vr) as an implicit function of vr (Implicit Function Theorem) with
dj
dvr
=  @j=@vr
@j=@vd
< 0:
Since @r@vr <
@d
@vr
< 0 and @d@vd <
@r
@vd
< 0 it is obvious that drdvr <
dd
dvr
< 0:
Boundaries. Start by evaluating d (vr; vd) at end points. Observe that
d (0; 0) > d (1; 0) = pd (1; 0) + 
 (1; 0) > 0:
In addition
d (0; 1) = d (1; 1) =  1= < 0;
because  (1) = 1: Since d (1; 0) > 0 and d (1; 1) < 0 and d decreases in vd the Intermediate Value
Theorem guarantees existence of some vd 2 (0; 1) such that d (1; vd) = 0; i.e., d (1) = vd. Similarly
d (0; 0) > 0 and d (0; 1) < 0 implies existence of some vd 2 (0; 1) such that d (0; vd) = 0, i.e., d (0) = vd.
Note that d (1) < d (0) and since d decreases in vr we have vd < vd:
Now evaluate r (vr; vd) at end points. Similar to above, one can show that r (0; 0) > r (0; 1) > 0
and r (1; 1) =  1= < 0. However r (1; 0) can be positive or negative.
The existence of vr 2 (0; 1) follows from the facts that r (0; 1) > 0, r (1; 1) < 0 and that r decreases
in vr: The Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees that there is some vr 2 (0; 1) such that r (vr; 1) = 0
which is equivalent to r (vr) = 1: Existence of vr or vd hinges on the sign of r (1; 0) ; as we show below.
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 Suppose r (1; 0) < 0 : Since r (0; 0) > 0 there exists some vr 2 (0; 1) such that r (vr; 0) = 0 or
equivalently r (vr) = 0; and since r is a decreasing function of vr we have vr < vr:
 Suppose r (1; 0) > 0 : First we will show that r (1; vd) < 0: Notice that
d (1; vd) r (1; vd) =
1  F (vd)
F 0 (vd)
+

 (+ )
[1  F (vd)]2
F 0 (vd)
+
1  vd

> 0:
Since d (1; vd) = 0 it is must be that r (1; vd) < 0: Now, since r (1; 0) > 0 there exists some
v
d
2 (0; vd) such that r

1; v
d

= 0 or equivalently r (1) = vd: 
Existence and Uniqueness. Below we argue that there exists a unique interior vr satisfying r (v

r ) =
d (v

r ) : Dene { (vr) := r (vr)  d (vr) and notice that it decreases in vr since
d{
dvr
=
dr
dvr
  dd
dvr
< 0:
Now we will verify that { (vr) > 0 and { (1) < 0: Indeed { (vr) = r (vr)  d (vr) = 1   d (vr) > 0 since
d (vr) < d (0) = vd < 1: Similarly { (1) = r (1) d (1) = r (1)  vd < 0 since r (1) is either negative or
equals to v
d
both of which are smaller than vd: Consequently the Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees
existence of a unique vr 2 (vr; 1) such that r (vr ) = d (vr ) = vd.
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